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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
I 
STATE.M:ENT OF FACTS 
Both defendant and third party defendants assert 
that plaintiffs failed in their proof with respect to cau-
sation and that, therefore, the jury's answers to the 
special interrogatories can be justified. Though, as will 
be demonstrated later, the jury found to the contrary, 
it is necessary to here clarify the facts. Plaintiffs readily 
concede that the facts on appeal must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to respondents, but plaintiffs do 
not concede that respondents are at liberty to blatantly 
omit undisputed testimony. Defendants, in this line, 
assert that plaintiffs' case rests upon expert testimony 
that a wind force of twenty-five miles per hour would 
cause the rusty, defective, broken part to fail and result 
in the jib falling and killing the decedents, and that 
though several witnesses testified that it was windy and 
gusty, there was no evidence as to the velocity of the 
wind at the time of the accident or as to its direction. 
William Giroux, an engineer employed by Arch 
Dam, arrived upon the scene immediately after the 
accident. (R. 358). He testified, without contradiction, 
that he then discovered a rusty and broken jib con· 
nection. (R. 362-364). He clearly explained how pres· 
sure from wind could cause the old broken connection 
to fail and the jib to fall to the ground and kill the 
decedents. (R. 367, 368). He testified that at the scene 
of the accident the wind was gusty. (R. 367). 
Daniel Schwartz, an eminently qualified mechanical 
design engineer, testified that a detailed study of the 
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mechanics of the jib demonstrated conclusively that 
the connection was designed to withstand wind forces 
uf 110 miles per hour (R. 454) with a safety factor of 
ffre times that force (R. 455), and that a steady wind 
foree of twenty-five miles an hour would cause the rusty, 
broken part to fail, and that gusts of wind would in-
crease the force up to fifty percent by reason of the 
dynamics of rocking of the structure, comparable to 
shocks or vibrations. (R. 422, 423, 453, 454). 
The wind was described by witness Carlberg as 
"windy and gusty" (R. 197), and that when the acci-
dent happened he believed a gust of wind had blown 
the jib over, and there were times when gusts would 
have more wind force than at other times, and that the 
wind at times blew upstream against the dam and then 
shot upwards to go over the top of the dam resulting 
in a venturi or funnel-like effect (R. 212) which would 
cause the wind to strike the portion of the jib described 
by Giroux and Schwartz. (R. 369). 
The crane operator, Twitchell, described the winds 
as gusty, a condition he had experienced before at the 
Flaming Gorge dam (R. 258), and the oiler, Holmes, 
described the wind as "windy and gusty." (R. 284). 
There is no testimony that the wind condition was 
other than as above described. 
The composite of the above is that the weather 
condition was windy and gusty (a condition that of ten 
existed), and that the direction of the wind was towards 
the very portion of the jib that would cause the broken 
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part to fail and that the undisputed mechanics of the 
jib connection and its faulty part would result in failure 
from a gust of wind. 
ARGU.MENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANTS' CLAIM OF OPERATOR 
NEGLIGENCE IS CONTRARY TO THE 
FINDING OF THE JURY. 
The overriding fallacy with defendant's and third 
party defendants' arguments that after all what really 
happened was operator negligence is that the jury 
found to the contrary. The jury found that the crane 
contained a defect when it was delivered to Arch Dam 
by Shurtleff & Andrews, and that Arch Dam's failure 
to discover this defect was a proximate cause of the 
accident. If the jury had found operator negligence 
as the cause of this tragedy, it could not have found 
as it did that the defect existing in the crane and Arch 
Dam's failure to discover it was the proximate cause 
of the accident. The stretched reasoning about plain-
tiffs' alleged failure of scientific proof as to causation 
is faulty in view of the jury's findings. The jury had 
ample instructions as to the alleged intervening cause 
of the operator (R. 106, 108, 115), and if it found that 
the operator caused the accident, it could not, under 
the court's instruction, have found that the defect was 
a proximate cause of the accident. 
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It is interesting to note that third party defendants, 
on page 10 of their brief, conclude: 
"In order for the plaintiffs to be entitled to 
recover against defendant, they had the burden 
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
the following facts: 
1. There was a defect in defendant's crane at 
the time the crane was leased to Arch Dam. 
2. A reasonable inspection should have dis-
covered the defect. 
3. The defect was the cause of the accident." 
The jury f O'und each of the above elements in the 
affirmative. By interrogatory No. 2, the jury found a 
defect "prior to its delivery to the lessee" and that an 
inspection would have discovered it. By interrogatory 
No. 3 (a) , the jury found "a reasonable prudent lessee" 
should have discovered the defect, and by interrogatory 
No. 3 ( b) , the jury found that such failure to discover 
the defect was a proximate cause of the accident. If 
the jury had found operator negligence to be the super-
seding cause of the accident, it could not have answered 
any one of the three interrogatories as it did. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANTS' CLAIM THAT THERE 
WAS MORE THAN ONE DEFECT, OR THAT 
A DEFECT OCCURRED AFTER DELIVERY 
OF THE CRANE IS SPECIOUS. 
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There is only one defect in this case, to wit: An 
elongated, rusty, broken part. There is not one shred 
of evidence about any other defect in the crane. From 
the entire record, there are only three possible causes 
of the accident, to wit: 
(a) An Act of God; 
(b) Operator negligence; or 
( c) A defective jib connection. 
The jury expressly found no Act of God in its answer 
to Interrogatory No. I. The jury expressly found a 
defect at time of delivery in its answer to Interrogatory 
No. 2. The jury expressly found no operator's negli-
gence in its answer to Interrogatory No. 3 (b) wherein 
it found the defect caused the accident. Defendant's 
argument is: "True, it may have been guilty of negli-
gence in failing to inspect, but the inspection would 
not have revealed anything, and the defect really oc-
curred after its duty ended." There is no doctrine that 
failure to inspect is negligence if the inspection would 
not have revealed anything. The claimed doctrine is 
allegedly supported by the citation of a fragment of 
Restatement of Torts 2d § 300, Comment c. If the 
rule and the entire comment is read, it clearly applies 
to a situation where two defects exist, one of which is 
causative, and the other is not. The rule is that the 
failure to discover both defects is negligence though 
the failure to discover the defect that did not cause 
the accident is not the proximate cause. In fact, Re· 
statement of Torts 2d, § 282, defines negligence: 
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"In the Restatement of this Subject, negli-
gence is conduct which falls below the standard 
established by law for the protection of others 
against unreasonable risk of harm. It does not 
include conduct recklessly disregardful of an 
interest of others." 
And Comment c thereof provides: 
"The concept of unreasonable risk includes 
the existence of a risk and also its unreasonable 
character." 
Attempting to stretch the evidence to support a 
finding that the defect occurred after delivery of the 
crane is useless in view of the jury's express finding 
to Interrogatory No. I that the defect existed at the 
time of delivery. Third party defendants again attempt 
to summarize the case and conclude at page 9 of their 
brief that plaintiffs should fail because, in any event, 
the evidence would support the following findings: 
(I) That the defect occurred or became subject to 
discovery after the last time defendant had an oppor-
tunity to inspect; or (2) Arch Dam's failure to discover 
was an independent intervening act; or ( 3) The negli-
gence of the crane operator was an independent inter-
vening act. "\Vith respect to (I), the jury found the 
defect occurred when the crane was delivered by de-
fendant. "\Vith respect to (2), Arch Dam's failure to 
discover, as a matter of law, could not have been an 
independent intervening act, as thoroughly discussed 
in plaintiffs' prime brief on file herein. With respect 
to (3), the jury found to the contrary. 
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POINT III. 
THERE IS NO DOCTRINE THAT SO.ME 
NEGLIGENCE CAN BE A MINOR CAUSE 
AND OTHER NEGLIGENCE A MAJOR 
CAUSE. 
Defendant claims that in any event, its negligence 
could have been considered by the jury to be a minor 
cause, and the negligence of Arch Dam in failing to 
discover the defect a minor cause and the real alleged 
negligence of the operator a major cause, citing a por-
tion of Restatement of Torts 2d 431, Comment b, as 
authority. A cursory reading of the rule and the com-
ments show that the Restatement cited simply lays 
down the "substantial factor" test in determining proxi· 
mate cause. If the jury had found that Arch Dam's 
failure to discover the defect was not a substantial 
factor, they would and could not have found that it was 
a proximate cause of the accident. 
POINT IV. 
SUITS IN BREACH OF WARRANTY 
ARE NOT LIMITED TO SALES ACT TRANS· 
ACTIONS. 
A claim predicated upon breach of warranty does 
not require a sale. Both defendant and third party 
defendants conceded that the "modern" and the "en· 
lightened" views no longer require privity with respect 
to a warranty proceeding, but urge this court to be 
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unenlightened and antiquated, and further suggest that 
despite the pronouncement of Acme Crane Rental Com-
pany, 14 Utah 2d 300, 383 P .2d 487 ( 1963) , this court 
really did not intend to hold that warranties extend to 
leased chattels, at least as far as personal injury liti-
gation is concerned. 
The landmark case with respect to abrogation of 
privity is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 
N. J. 3.58, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), 75 ALR 2d 1. 
The X ew Jersey court clearly extends the implied war-
ranty of fitness to bailments for hire, and pronounces 
that privity of contract is not required and that the 
warranty extends for the duration of the rental period. 
See Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 
.... A.2d .... , (N.J., August 4, 1965). The court states: 
"A bailor for hire, such as a person in the U -
drive-it business, puts motor vehicles in the 
stream of commerce in a fashion not unlike a 
manufacturer or retailer. In fact such a bailor 
puts the vehicle he buys and then rents to the 
public to more sustained use on the highways 
than most ordinary car purchasers. The very 
nature of the business is such that the bailee, his 
employees, passengers and the traveling public 
are exposed to a greater quantum of potential 
danger of harm from defective vehicles than 
usually arises out of1.sales by the manufacturer. 
'Ve held in Santor [Santor v. A & M Kara-
gheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A. 2d 305 
( 1965)] the liability of the manufacturer might 
be expressed in terms of strict liability in tort 
. By analogy the same rule should be made 
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applicable to the U-drive-it-bailor-bailee rela. 
tionship. Such a rental must be regarded as ac. 
companied by a representation that the vehicle 
is fit for operation on the public highways." 
"Since the exposure of the user and the public 
to harm is great if the rented vehicle fails during 
ordinary use on a highway, the answer must be 
that the warranty continues for the agreed rental 
period. The public interests involved are justly 
served only by treating an obligation of th;t 
nature as an incident of the business enterprise. 
The operator of the rental business must be re· 
garded as possessing expertise with respect to 
the service life and fitness of his vehicles for use. 
That expertise ought to put him in a better posi-
tion than the bailee to detect or to anticipate 
flaws or defects or fatigue in his vehicles. More-
over, as between bail or for hire and bailee the 
liability for flaws or defects not discoverable br 
ordinary care in inspecting or testing ought t~ 
rest with the bailor just as it rests with a manu-
facturer who buys components containing latent 
defects from another maker, and installs them 
in the completed product, or just as it rests with 
a retailer at the point of sale to the consumer. 
And, with respect to failure of a rented vehicle 
from fatigue, since control of the length of the 
lease is in the lessor, such risk is one, which in the 
interests of the consuming public as well as of 
the members of the public traveling the highways, 
ought to be imposed on the rental business." 
"Obviously Hertz knew when the leasing took 
place that Contract Packers' employees would 
be using the trucks as drivers or helpers. In such 
a situation absence of privity between plaintiff 
and Hertz is of no legal consequence." 
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Accord, 1 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability, 
~ 19.02 ( 1904) ; Farnsworth, "Implied Warranties of 
Quality in Non-Sales Cases," 57 Columbia L.Rev. 653 
( 1957) ; Prosser Torts § 95, pp. 655-56 ( 3d) ed. 1964) ; 
{i8 ALR 2d 850 ( 1959) ; Delaney v. Tow-motor Corp., 
339 F.2d 4 ( 2d Cir. 1964) (defective fork lift truck 
not sold but merely on loan to plaintiff's employer) ; 
Greeno v. Clark Equipm~nt Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 
(N.D. Ind. 1965) (defective fork lift truck leased to 
plaintiff's employer) ; Booth Steamship Co. v. Meier 
& Oellwf Co., 262 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1958) (latent de-
fect in bailed wire strap causing amputation of work-
man's thumb; strict privity-free warranty liability ap-
plied to bailor, machinists overhauling ship); Eastern 
11fotor Express v. A. Maschmeijer, Jr., Inc., 247 F.2d 
826 (2d Cir. 1957), 65 ALR 2d 765, cert. denied, 355 
l!.S. 959 ( 1958) (defective containers delivered to car-
rier by shipper; strict liability). 
POINT V. 
DEFENDANT CANNOT CLAII\-1 ERROR 
\VHICH IT 'VILL NOT CALL TO THE AT-
TENTION OF THIS COURT. 
Perhaps in desperation, defendant asserts that in 
any e\'ent, it made substantial exception and objection 
to various undisclosed matters at the trial, and that in 
no event can plaintiffs have judgment until respondent 
asserts these alleged errors. Certainly, all matters 
sought to be reviewed herein must be brought to the 
court's attention. See Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, et al, 
121 Utah 359, 242 P.2d 297. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant and third party defendants have failed 
to squarely meet the precise legal result of the jury\ 
answers to the special interrogatories herein. The find-
ings of the jury entitle plaintiffs and appellants to judg-
ment as a matter of law for the damages found by the 
Jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Delbert M. Draper, Jr. 
Draper, Sandack & Saperstein 
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 
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